Florida Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 3

Article 5

March 1973

Florida's Alcoholic Beverage Laws: Whose Interests are
Protected?
Martha L. Cochran

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Martha L. Cochran, Florida's Alcoholic Beverage Laws: Whose Interests are Protected?, 25 Fla. L. Rev. 542
(1973).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Cochran:
Florida's Alcoholic
Beverage
Whose Interests[Vol.
areXXV
Protected?
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW Laws:
REVIEW
It serves no practical purpose to attempt to fit warranty liability into
the classification of negligence liability or absolute liability nor to
attempt to discern whether warranty liability is now tortious or contractual ....
[Warranty is for all practical purposes a type of liability
distinct unto itself.
Defenses and liability are questions of public policy and social forces. In light
of these considerations the legislature has provided what it considers an
acceptable scheme for controlling the duties and rights between merchants
and consumers of defective products. Notice of breach is an important element of that scheme and should continue to be used in protecting merchants
from undue prejudice resulting from stale claims.
MARVIN CHAVIS

FLORIDA'S ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAWS: WHOSE
INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED?
Confined only by constitutional due process1 and its corollary that laws
must bear a reasonable relation to the public welfare, 2 legislators possess
substantial latitude in regulating a privileged industry. Such an industry,
standing to gain or lose significantly from the framing of laws regulating it,
predictably turns its efforts toward the legislature to gain regulations favorable to it, to retain privileges it presently holds, and to prevent the future
institution of unfavorable restrictions. 3 Although the granting of special
favors is undesirable, even more pernicious is the continuation of privileges
already held.4 Legislative inaction that maintains the status quo is difficult
for the press and public to expose and criticize. From time to time, therefore,
it is critical that laws regulating such industries be scrutinized to determine
the success of efforts to retain these special privileges.
1. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
2. See, e.g., Pickerill v. Schott, 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815 (1952).
3. The efforts of Florida's liquor industry are typical. See, e.g., Gainesville (Fla.) Sun,
Jan. 1, 1973, §A at 4, col. 1.
4. See M. GREEN, J. FALLOWS & D. ZWICK, WHO RUNS CONGRESS? 22 (1972). In discussing the influence of big business on the United States Congress, the authors state:
"It used to be that corporations helped their candidates in return for an even larger slice
of the government's pie; nowadays many big businessmen find they already have as much
as they can decorously eat. Their main concern is to guarantee against shrinkage, and
they view their campaign contributions as a kind of insurance policy." Id.
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The alcoholic beverage industry in Florida underwent such a scrutiny
in a study issued in December 1972 by the Florida House Committee on Business Regulation. 6 Author of the report, committee chairman William
Andrews," charged that certain provisions in the beverage laws no longer
serve the public interest, but instead serve the "special" interests of the beverage industry.7 A study of three provisions of the beverage laws, comparing
the legislative intent and present effect of those provisions, evidenced a
factual basis for the daim.
This note will examine those sections of Florida beverage laws dealing
with retail license issuance, excise tax collections and retail credit restrictions,
suggesting that their continued alteration by amendments has in fact relegated the consumer's interest to a status secondary to that of the beverage
industry itself. An initial look at the original goals of the beverage laws and
the historical development of these laws is appropriate.
THE HIsToRICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE REGULATION

With the passage of the twenty-first amendment" and the repeal of prohibition in 1935, 9 much of the liquor regulation previously in the realm of
the federal government shifted to the states. In developing legislation to
control the newly-legalized liquor industry, the states looked to the origins
of prohibition, the evils it was designed to eliminate, and the problems encountered during prohibition that made the "noble experiment" a failure.
In attempting to remedy the problems that 150 years of liquor regulation in
the United States had revealed, legislative attention focused on three specific
areas.10
Illegal and Corrupt Activities
A chief instigator of national prohibition was the saloon and the criminal
activities and corruption it fostered.", Many saloons were centers of organized
5. FLORIDA HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON BUSINESS REGULATION, REPORT ON
THE HISTORY OF FLORIDA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LEGISLATION (special report, Dec. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as BEVERAGE REPORT].
6. Representative Andrews was chairman of the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Business Regulation during the 1971-1972 legislative session and initiated substantial revisions of the beverage laws during that session. See, e.g., notes 35, 36, 104
and accompanying text infra. As a research assistant to Representative Andrews from
June to December 1972, I assisted in the preparation of the Beverage Report and make
extensive reference to it in this note.
7. BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
8. US. CoNsT. amend. XXI.
9. U.S.C.A. §§1-108 (Supp. 1972). This statute repealed the National Prohibition Act
and other legislation implementing the 18th amendment.
10. See, e.g., Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774.
11. NATIONAL CoM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWs OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOG. No. 722, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. 6-7 (1931) [hereinafter cited as PROHIBITION REPORT]. "The saloons were generally
centers of political activity, and a large number of saloon keepers were local political

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/5

2

Cochran:
Florida's Alcoholic
Beverage
Whose Interests are Protected?
REVIEW
LAWLaws:
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY
[Vol. XXV

prostitution and gambling, accompanied by widespread corruption of police
and government officials by the liquor interests. 12 Later, during the years of
prohibition, bootlegging developed on a large scale and led to gang wars and
other underworld crimes.' 3 Consequently, post-prohibition liquor regulation
attempted to control this inherent relationship between the liquor industry
and criminal activity.
Raising Revenue
Second, liquor regulation provided for the collection of taxes on legally
manufactured liquor and the prevention of tax avoidance on illegally manufactured liquor. The first session of the Congress of the United States passed
legislation taxing the importation of beer, spirits, wine, and certain other
beverages.14 Since that time, liquor was regularly taxed in the United States
until prohibition eliminated alcoholic beverage taxation. Post-prohibition
liquor legislation again tapped this source of revenue and provided for the
collection of taxes and the enforcement of tax payment.
Antitrust Goals
Finally, post-prohibition beverage legislation sought to insure open competition by preventing monopolistic practices. The years preceding prohibition taught that, without controls, a few large organizations could dominate
the industry and gain control over retail outlets."5 Thus, new legislative provisions were enacted to limit the possible means of control manufacturers
and distributors of alcoholic beverages could exercise over retailers.

leaders. Organized liquor interests contributed to the campaign expenses of candidates
for national, state and local offices . . . . Laws and ordinances regulatory of saloons
were constantly and notoriously violated in many localities. . . . Commercialized vice
and gambling went hand in hand with the saloons. When proceedings were taken to
forfeit saloon licenses because of violation of the law, it was a common practice for the
brewers to procure surety company bonds and provide counsel to resist forfeiture. The
liquor organizations raised large funds to defeat the nomination or election of legislators
who opposed their interests."
12. Id. at 6.
13. For a five-volume report on the activities of organized crime during the Prohibition
Era, see U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT, S. Doc.
No. 307, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931).
14. PROHIBITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 4. For a discussion of revenue raising from
the colonial liquor traffic, see J. KaouT, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 18-24 (1925).
15. PROHIBITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 6: "[T]he days of the old independent local
tavern keeper were gone. The business of brewing and that of distilling came to be
organized. The local brewer and local distiller supplying a limited local trade gave way
to great corporations, organized on modern lines, each prepared to do a huge business
and seeking to expand by finding new markets and increasing their business in old markets.
Competition between these corporations was keen. . . . Sales organization was developed.
More and more the local seller ceased to be independent and became a mere creature of
some producer. .

..

Legislation preventing such corporations from holdings [sic]licenses

was not hard to evade and ran counter to the settled economic current."
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The FloridaBeverage Act
Florida's original Alcoholic Beverage Act of 193516 accommodated these
three problem areas with law designed to regulate the alcoholic beverage
industry in the public interest. Of necessity, the 1935 solutions later were
modified to deal with developing problems of the growing beverage industry.
However, as the legal liquor industry grew, the industry itself became a
powerful and influential spokesman for the framing of the laws that controlled it.. Consequently, numerous amendments since 1935 have altered
not only the solutions but also the intended effect of the original act. Although the legislature recently effected useful changes in Florida's alcoholic
beverage law,' 8 in order to restore the public interest purpose of these laws
the provisions dealing with retail license issuance, excise tax collection discounts, and credit restrictions need further revision.
LICENSING: PRoTEcTIoN OF THE PUBLIC M ORALrrY OR RESTRAINT ON
COMPEInTION?

The privileged business concept, 19 with its attendant premise that engaging in the sale of alcoholic beverages was not a right but a privilege, justified
the requirement that persons wishing to engage in the business must obtain
a license from the state. By limiting the privilege of doing business, licensing
under the 1935 Beverage Act 20 curtailed illegal and corrupt activity in the
liquor industry in two ways.
First, certain qualifications were placed on licensees before they were
privileged to engage in the sale of alcoholic beverages. Applicants were
required to be adults of good moral character, having no previous conviction
of an offense involving moral turpitude. 21 No person under sentence or parole
could be granted a license nor could persons convicted of violating the act
receive another license for two years. 22 The effect of this provision was to
bar those persons from the liquor business who previously had demonstrated

16. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774.
17. See, e.g., The Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), Sept. 15, 1972. §B at 3. col. 4.
18. See, e.g., notes 35, 36, 104 and accompanying text infra.
19. It has been judicially established in Florida that dealing in intoxicating liquors
"because its character tends to be injurious [is a] mere privilege, rather than a right."
Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 228, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947). Consequently, there
is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors. Mears v. Stone, 151 Fla. 760,
10 So. 2d 487 (1942).
20. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774.
21. Id. §3.
22. Id. It became apparent through later amendments that what the legislature had
in mind was to prevent involvement with certain types of crimes. A 1961 amendment
prohibited the issuance of a license to a person who within the previous five years had
been convicted of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution,
keeping a disorderly place, or illegally dealing in narcotics. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-219, §1.
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a lack of respect for the law. This basic principle was carried into the present law. 23
In addition to preventing the criminally disposed from entering the
liquor business, the civil penalty of license revocation 24 kept persons already
engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages from violating liquor laws or
involving themselves or their businesses in criminal activities. At stake was
the loss of the privilege of engaging in the business, as well as the cost of
the license25
The Quota
Licensing adequately effectuated the original goals of beverage regulation
until 1947 when the legislature undermined its own efforts to maintain open
competition in the liquor industry by imposing a limitation by population
or "quota" on the number of licenses that could be issued. 26 The quota
applied to package stores and lounges selling any alcoholic beverage, regardless of alcoholic content, and the number of such licenses within a county
was limited to one for each 2,500 residents.2 7 Licenses to vendors of "beer
and wine only" were not limited. In addition, the issuance of special hotel
or restaurant licenses and a certain number of special club licenses were permitted but not counted in the quota. 28 The act further provided that the
limits prescribed would not affect existing or future special acts that limited
29
by population such licenses within any incorporated city, town, or county.
Pressure from two divergent interest groups may have contributed to the
placing of quotas on lounge and package store licenses.30 First, the apostles of
temperance sought to limit the number of businesses selling alcoholic beverages with the purpose of limiting the amount of alcoholic beverages consumed.31 Joining them were those already in the business who recognized an
excellent opportunity to limit the number of their competitors.
23. FLA. STAT. §561.15 (1971). The provisions of the current statute are similar to the
text accompanying notes 21-22 supra and the text in note 22 supra.
24. FLA. STAT. §561.29 (1971).
25. See notes 41, 42, 48 infra.
26. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23746, §2 (4). The quota provision is presently found in FLA.
STAT. §561.20 (Supp. 1972).
27. The original provision stated that no license should be issued so that the number
of licenses within the limits of any incorporated city or town or in the territory of any
county lying outside such city or town would exceed one license for each 2500 residents.
Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23746, §2 (4). The limitation specifically did not prohibit the issuance
of at least two licenses in any such city or town or three licenses in any county territory
lying outside the city or town. Id. A 1955 amendment eliminated the provision for at least
two licenses in any city. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29786, §4. In 1972 the 2500-resident limit
was made county wide. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-260.
28. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23746, §2(4).
29. Id. This provision is found in FLA. STAT. §561.20(4) (1971).
30. See BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
31. Id. For a discussion of the theories of restrictive licensing and its relation to the
volume of alcohol consumption, see Levin, Economic and Regulatory Aspects of Liquor
Licensing, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 792-93 (1964).
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After the quota was adopted it accommodated interests beyond the original intent of the act by serving as a source of patronage for the Governor
who distributed the new licenses available after each census.3 2 An additional
source of patronage emanated from the legislature because of its power to
enact special acts or general acts of local application, 3 including those that
increased the population requirements or decreased the number of available
hIrenses.
In the 1972 legislative session the limitations on dub licenses were eliminated,35 and uniform standards for special restaurant licenses, removed by
the 1961 legislature, were reinstated.3 6 Although these standards did not

32. BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. FLA. STAT. §20.16 (1) (1971) now provides

that the Governor appoint the members of the Board of Business Regulation who in turn
appoint the Director of the Division of Beverage. FLA. STAT. §20.16 (4) (1971). The Division
of Beverage approves the issuance of licenses. FLA. STAT. §561.19 (1971). The Florida
supreme court recently clarified the power of the Board of Business Regulation (and
therefore its Division of Beverage) to issue new alcoholic beverage licenses based upon
population increases reflected by the 1970 federal census. State ex rel. Pettigrew v. Kirk,
243 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1970). Under the Florida constitution the federal census does not
become effective "for the purpose of classifications based upon population" until the
30th day after the final adjournment of the regular session of the legislature convened
next after the census is certified. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §8(b). The court found that the
quota on liquor licenses was such a classification based on population, and held that
article X applied, preventing the immediate issuance of new licenses until the legislature
had "an opportunity to examine the new Federal Census and to enact any new legislation required to protect the public interest." 243 So. 2d 147, 150 (1970). The resultant
"new legislation" passed to protect the public interest was a moratorium on the issuance
of additional licenses until September 1, 1972. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-238, §1.
33. In 1961 the special status for restaurants was removed, and new restaurant liquor
licenses were included in the quota limits. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-300, §1. The result of
the change was not fewer retail liquor outlets. Instead, in the period from 1963 to 1971
the legislature passed 36 special acts that permitted the issuance of "special' liquor
licenses to restaurants in various counties. See BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 12. For
a summary of these laws, see FLA. H.R. COMM. ON BUSINESS REGULATION, ALcoHomc BEVERAGE

FACTs BOOK §26 (unpublished, looseleaf compilation of laws, regulations, letters, and
memoranda relating to Florida alcoholic beverage regulation, in the offices of the Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Business Regulation, Tallahassee, Fla. [hereinafter cited as BUSINESS REG.
FAcrs BooK]).

34. Such acts apply to six counties: Duval (Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-1501); Lake (Fla.
Laws 1970, ch. 70-527); Leon (Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-1561); Orange (Fla. Laws 1955, ch.
55-31098); Polk (Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-909); Nassau (Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1600). The
first three permit one license for each 5,000 residents, and the last three allow one for
each 4,000 residents. With all other factors being equal (for example, tourist traffic,
average per capita income in the county, et cetera), it is obvious that the value of a
license in counties with higher population requirements should significantly exceed the
value of a license in counties with the one for each 2,500 residents requirement.
35. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-230. Prior to this time, licenses issued to persons associated
together as chartered or incorporated clubs under FLA. STAT. §561.34(11) were limited to
xxo more than five more than the number of such licenses in effect on May 24, 1947, when
the original limitation by population was instituted. See FLA. STAT. §561.20(6) (1971).
Dade County was allowed 25 more than. the 1947 number. Id.
36. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-230, amending FLA. STAT. §561.20(2) (1971). Restaurant
licenses had been placed within the quota limits in 1961. See note 33 supra.
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apply to licenses issued under prior law,a3 the act made future local acts
unnecessary, therefore eliminating this source of patronage. There remains
a quota on licenses for package stores and lounges, however.38
Should the Quota Be Retained?
While the quota provisions prohibit the issuance of a new license to
anyone already owning a license, 39 they fail to prevent the purchase of additional existing licenses by a license holder. Therefore, by acquiring a large
number of licenses an organization may dominate the sales of alcoholic
40
beverages from package stores and lounges in an area.
Another inequity results from the effect of the quota system in inflating
the value of existing licenses. A new entry into the market must pay the
seller many times what the original owner paid the state. 41 This obviously
encourages the holding of many licenses by a powerful few and discourages
individuals without substantial finances from competing in the "privileged"
business. Furthermore, the excess of the inflated license value over the original cost of the license, although created by the state imposed quota, accrues
42
to the previous owner and not to the state.

37.

FLA. STAT.

38. FLA.

§561.20(2) (1971).

§561.20(1) (Supp. 1972).
39. Id. § (5).
40. On October 1, 1971, there were 2,973 quota licenses outstanding in Florida. Three
hundred and forty-eight or 12% were held by licensees owning five or more licenses. A.B.C.
Liquors, for example, held 101 licenses while Castlewood International Corp. held 51.
BUSINFSS REG. FAcTs BOOK, supra note 33, at 26. On October 1, 1972, there continued to
be 2,973 quota licenses outstanding. BEVERAcE REPORT, supra note 5, Appendix I. However, 452 or more than 15% were held by licensees, owning five or more licenses. A.B.C.
Liquors, by purchasing existing licenses, had increased the number of licenses it held
to 131, and Castlewood increased its licenses to 77. BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, Appendix
III. Although there presently may be too many retail outlets statewide for a single
organization to have a dramatic effect, it is apparent that the biggest retail organizations
are increasing their license holdings, indicating that their future influence on retail sales
will be significant.
41. The vendor's license fee for spirituous liquors is $1,750 for counties with a population over 100,000. FLA. STAT. §565.02(1) (Snpp. 1972). The actual market value of the
license may be as high as $25,000-$70,000. See Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Jan. 31, 1973, §D
at 1, col. 1. The 1972 revisions, by increasing in excess of quota limits the potential number
of establishments authorized to sell liquor, may diminish the going rate for quota licenses.
Revisions that may yield this result are the lifting of the quota on club licenses and the
removal of special restaurant licenses from the general quota provision. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra. The authorization for the owner of a hotel or motel to lease
his restaurant operation to another individual, corporation, or association to operate
independently of the hotel or motel may further stimulate an increase in the number of
non-quota liquor licenses, thereby decreasing the value of the individual licenses. See
FLA. STAT.

STAT.

§561.20 (2) (a) (Supp. 1972).

42. While the original licensee pays the state a maximum of $1,750, upon selling his
right to engage in the privileged business he may receive a $25,000 to $70,000 "bonus."
See id.
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In light of these known effects, does the temperance goal of the original
act merit retaining the quota limitation? There is little empirical data to
support the supposition that more package stores will result in increased
beverage sales or that fewer will result in decreased sales. 43 Moreover, the
fact that broad zoning powers are now granted cities and counties suggests
that the fear of a "liquor store on every corner" is no longer valid. 44
The temperance argument is further discredited by a look at the number
of quota licenses issued in relation to the total number of licensed alcoholic
beverage outlets. As of October 1, 1972, there were 20,635 retail alcoholic
beverage licenses outstanding in Florida. 45 Of these, 5,240 were permitted to
sell all types of beverages, regardless of alcoholic content, and 2,978 of these
were quota licenses. The one-for-each-2,500 residents figure is therefore deceptive, since it does not account for hotel, motel, and restaurant licenses or for
licenses to private clubs.4 6 Unless there are special acts to the contrary, these
licenses are available in unlimited numbers, and such licensees may even sell
packaged beverages.47
Clearly then, the person who wants a drink will not be thwarted by the
limited number of lounge and package outlets. It is equally clear, however,
that the person who wishes to enter the retail liquor business will be thwarted
by the limited availability of licenses and the prohibitive cost of "buying out"
an existing licensee. The only remaining purpose that can be served by the
limited availability of licenses is that of making the licensee's "stake" in his
business more valuable and thereby encouraging the licensee to be more

43. In an examination of per capita liquor consumption in a New York study, adult
population per package store was introduced as a variable on the assumption that, if restrictive licensing did exert any significant restraining effect on consumption, per capita liquor
sales would be lower where population per package store was higher (holding constant all
other variables) Levin, supra note 31, at 797. Although the study found gross per capita sales
of liquor decreased .45% for every 1% increase in population per package store, the author
warned of the hazards in inferring any causal relationship. Id. at 798. He suggested that
when licensing in New York was less restrictive, economically rational businessmen would
have flocked to areas where large liquor sales could be anticipated and today would stay
away from areas where income and population density are low and non-drinkers numerous.
The author concluded that variations in licenses per county population may reflect rather
than cause variations in per capita liquor store sales. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. §561.44 (1) (1971) grants cities and towns the power to establish municipal
zoning ordinances restricting the locations where a licensed vendor may be allowed to conduct his business. Further, the board of county commissioners may by resolution establish
zones or areas in the territory outside the limits of incorporated cities or towns wherein
licensed vendors may be permitted to operate. Id. § (2). No licenses will be issued by the
Division of Beverage in violation of municipal ordinances or in contravention of a county
resolution. Id. §§ (1), (2).
45. BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, Appendix I.
46. These esablishments are exempt from the quota restrictions under FLA. STAT.
§ §561.20 (2), -(6) (Supp. 1972).
47. Originally, the provision that excepted restaurant licenses from the general law
contained a prohibition against package sales for consumption off the premises. Fla. Laws
1957, ch. 57-773, §1. The 1972 amendment that placed restaurants again within the exceptions to the quota failed to include the package sale prohibition. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-230.
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law-abiding. 48 It is possible that the quota system, by inflating the license
value, may have some indirect effect on curtailing undesired activity. However, the loss of the business investment, along with the threat of criminal
penalties and fines for certain activities, 49 appear to be greater deterrents to
criminal involvement or violation of the beverage laws than loss of the license
itself.
It would be a simple task for the legislature to remove the quota limitations as it did the restrictions on club licenses. There doubtlessly would be an
initial increase in the number of retail outlets in some areas. However, the
foremost goal of licensing, the creation of a privileged business regulated by
the state and free from the influence of criminal activities, would not be
subverted by the issuance of additional licenses to qualified applicants. The

principle effect would be to allow free entry into the retail liquor industry,
with the result of lower prices to the consumer and fairness to all participants in the industry.
SUBSIDIZING THE INDUSTRY: "CREDITS"

FOR DISTRIBUTORS AND MANUFACTURERS

The 1935 Beverage Act imposed two taxes on the alcoholic beverage
industry5° license fees and excise taxes. In form, these two taxes exist in the
present law, but the rates 51 as well as the method of collection2 have changed.
License taxes are levied on all three segments of the industry-manufacturers,

48. FLA. STAT. §561.32(1) (1971) allows for transfers of licenses for a bona fide sale of
the business but expressly provides: "[N]o one shall be entitled as a matter of right to a
transfer of a license when revocation or suspension proceedings have been instituted against
a licensee" (emphasis added). Thus, any increment in the value of his license may be forfeited by a licensee who engages in activities leading to a revocation of his license. See
notes 41-42 supra. In actual practice, however, it appears that the Division of Beverage has
permitted such transfers for licensees faced with revocation proceedings, the purpose being
"to divest people as soon as possible from running establishments that are not in the public
interest." Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Jan. 31, 1973, §D at 1, col. 1.
49. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §562.11 (Supp. 1972) (selling alcoholic beverages to minors);
FLA. STAT. §562.23 (1971) (conspiracy to violate the beverage law).
50. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774(5),-(9).
51. Florida ranked 6th in the nation in alcoholic beverage tax collections for 1970, with
$146,405,000

collected. LICENSED BEVERAGE INDUSTRIES,

INC., LBI FACTS

BOOK 39

(1971).

Taxes on alcoholic beverages contributed 10.3% of Florida's total state tax collections, and
Florida was fourth among all states in this category. Id. Effective October 1, 1971, Florida's
excise tax on spirituous liquors containing 14-48%, alcohol was increased from $2.60 to
$3.75 for each gallon, and on liquors containing over 48% alcohol the gallonage tax increased
from $5.52 to $7.50. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-362, §1. In 1971 there were only five other license
states taxing spirituous liquors near these rates: Alaska, Georgia, Minnesota, North Dakota,
and Oklahoma. See generally DISTILLED SPIRITS INSTITUTE, SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS AND
REGUt..XTIONS RELATING TO DISTILLED SPIRITS (1972). Seven other states collected excise taxes
on beer at or above the Florida rates: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. NATIONAL BREWERIEs ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL INFORMATION: TAxES 605-06 (rev. July 1972).
52.

See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
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distributors, and vendors.a 3 These fees remained at the 1935 rates54 until 1971
when all license fees were increased considerably. 55 Nevertheless, license fees
remain a rather insignificant portion of the over-all revenue raising scheme,
accounting for less than two per cent of the gross state revenues from the
liquor industry. 56
Excise taxes, however, account for over eighty per cent of all state revenues
from alcoholic beverage taxation, 57 and the rates have been raised frequently

since the 1935 Act. 58 While license fees are levied on all three segments of
the industry, responsibility for excise tax payment has fallen primarily on
the distributor. 59
Liquor Distributors
The original method of excise tax payment for spirituous liquors required
the affixation of previously purchased stamps to the bottles or containers
before sale of the beverages.6 In 1969, however, a reporting system 1 similar
to that used for malt beverages and wines62 was established in lieu of the
53. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-230 placed license fee provisions in the following sections:
beer vendors, FLA. STAT. §563.02 (1) (Supp. 1972), manufacturers, id. § (2), distributors, id.
§ (3); wine vendors, FLA. STAT. §564.02 (1) (Supp. 1972), manufacturers, id. § (2), distributors,
id. §(3); liquor vendors, FLA. STAT. §565.02(1) (Supp. 1972), manufacturers, FLA. STAT.
§565.03 (1) (Supp. 1972), distributors, id. § (2).
54. There was one exception: In 1947 a provision was added that increased the license
tax for vendors of beverages contaning 1-14% alcohol and wines. Fla. Laws 1947, ch.
23746, §5.
55. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-361, amending FLA. STAT. §561.34 (1969).
56. The Division of Beverage of the Florida Department of Business Regulation reported $2,264,910.68 total license fees out of $146,405,184.08 gross state revenue from alcoholic
beverages in 1970. DisTILLED BEVERAGE I
TuTE: PuBLc REVENUEs FROM ALcOHOLIC BEvERAGES 1970, 22.
57. The state colleted $120,532,340.59 in excise taxes out of $146,405,184.08 gross state
revenues from alcoholic beverage taxation. Id.
58. Taxes on malt beverages have been raised four times since 1935, from a 1935 rate
of three-fourths of a cent on each pint to four cents on each pint in 1968. Taxes on spirituous liquors (other than Florida products) have been raised by five different acts in the years
from 1935-1971. For a listing of the various acts relating to excises taxes see BEVrAGE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 22-25. Excise tax provisions are currently found in the following
sections of the Florida statutes: beer, FLA. STAT. §563.05 (Supp. 1972); wine, FLA. STAT.
§564.06 (Supp. 1972), and liquor, FLA. STAT. §565.12 (Supp. 1972).
59. There was one exception in the 1935 Act that called for excise tax payment by
vendors. Because operators of railroads, steamships, buses, and airplanes were not required
to purchase beverages from licensed distributors, they paid the excise tax on beverages sold
within Florida for which the tax previously had not been paid. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774 (5).
For the most part, however, distributors paid the tax (later collecting it from the retailer
who collected it from the consumer) under the law providing for the sale of excise tax
stamps to licensed distributors only. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774(9). The prohibition against
manufacturer to vendor sales also necessitates that the distributor, rather than the manufacturer, report the tax. FLA. STAT. §561.14 (1) (1971). See note 105 infra.
60. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774 (9).
61. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-49.
62. FLA. STAT. §563.07 (Supp. 1972).
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stamp provisions. The new system required the excise tax to be paid accom63
panying a monthly report on the quantity of beverages sold.
Discounts for the collection of excise taxes on spirituous liquors first
appeared in 194364 when an amendment to the stamp provision instructed
the Director of the Beverage Department to sell to distributors for cash $1.00
worth of stamps for 99 cents. In 1947 the distributor's cost was lowered to
98 cents.6 5 Because the distributor was required by law to affix the stamps
before selling,66 the rationale behind the discount was to compensate the
distributor for affixing the stamps and paying the tax on behalf of the
67

consumer.

The 1969 amendment, which instituted the present reporting system, cut
the distributor discount to one and four-tenths per cent of the tax due.68
Under the new system, however, distributors no longer must pay the tax
first and collect it later. Instead, distributors may collect the excise tax first
and remit the tax to the state by the 10th day of the month following the
sale.69 Thus, the one and four-tenths per cent deduction is now allowed the
distributor for the "keeping of records, furnishing bond, and accounting
70
for and remitting the taxes due."

It is difficult to justify the discount allowed distributors as a credit for
the expenses of keeping records and reporting the excise tax for the benefit
of the state. A comparison of the collection discount paid liquor distributors
7
with the discount paid retail vendors for sales tax collections is illustrative. 1
Assume an average retail price for a fifth of liquor to be $5.00. The sales tax
on this purchase is 20 cents of which the retailer may retain three per cent
or .6 of one cent. The beverage tax for the same transaction is $1.50 of which
the distributor may retain 1.4 per cent or 2.1 cents. The amount of discount
that accrues to the distributor is three and one-half times as much as the
discount paid to the retailer for the same transaction. Moreover, the distributor has the advantage of dealing in large quantities while the retail
vendor must account for many small transactions.
As noted in the Beverage Report, 72 although the distributor discount may
have been reasonable when distributors were required to pay the tax in
advance and also bear the cost of physically placing the stamps on the containers,7 3 it cannot be justified under the present system that relieves the
distributor of any expense of affixing stamps and permits him to collect the
63.

FLA. STAT.

64.

Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 22026, §3.

§565.13 (Supp. 1972).

65. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23746, §10.
66. Id.
67. Former FLA. STAT. §561.46(10) stressed that the excise tax was a consumer tax to
be paid by the consumer. This directive was repealed in 1963. FLA. LAWS 1963, ch. 63-485, §1.
68. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-49.
69. FLA. STAT. §565.13 (Supp. 1972).
70. Id. The bond required of distributors in light of the new method of tax collection
was raised to $100,000 (from $25,000 previously required). FLA. STAT. §561.371 (Supp. 1972).
71. This illustration is borrowed from BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 27-28.
72. Supra note 5, at 28.
73. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774(9).
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tax first and remit it later.74 The benefit accruing to distributors as a result of
this discount is augmented by statutory restrictions on credit between distributors and vendors-o that result in 100 per cent collections by distributors and
make available large sums of money to the distributors to use as working
76
capital without cost.
Beer Distributors
Although distributors of spirituous beverages paid excise taxes through
the purchase of revenue stamps, beer distributors originally used a reporting
system to account for excise taxes and therefore did not receive compensation for affixing stamps. In 1968, however, beer distributors were awarded a
three per cent discount "for the keeping of prescribed records, furnishing
bond, [and] properly accounting for and remitting taxes due to the State of
Florida."77
The inequity between discounts allowed retail merchants and beer distributors is similar to the liquor discount discussed above; the distributor receives about three and four-tenths times the amount paid the retailer on the
same transaction.78 The point that liquor distributors render no appreciable
services to justify their collection credits is equally applicable to beer distributors. In addition to the large collection discounts, however, beer distributors derive a further benefit from a statute requiring cash payment for
all beer and wine sales. 79 Distributors collect the excise tax immediately,
but are not required to remit it to the state until ten days after the month
of the sale.80 As a consequence, beer distributors are provided large amounts
of working capital during this time period s ' while the retail merchant is
deprived of these sums.
Wine Manufacturers
Wine distributors receive no excise tax collection credit as do distributors
of beer and spirituous liquors.8 2 However, Florida manufacturersand bottlers
of wine do receive a two per cent discount on the amount of taxes assessed
against wine as compensation for losses from shrinkage, filtering, and break-

74. FLA. STAT. §561.50 (1971).
75. FxA. STAT. §561.42 (1971).
76. See Appendix A (Daily Average of Excise Tax Available).
77. Fla. Laws Ex. Sess. 1968, ch. 68-28, § (2).
78. A six pack of half-quart cans of beer has an average retail price of $1.60 to which
is added $0.07 sales tax. The retail merchant is paid 3% of the sales tax or $0.0021. The
beer excise tax on this same six pack is $0.24 and the beer distributor is paid 3% of the
excise tax or $0.0072. Thus, the beer distributor receives 3A2 times the discount given the
retailer. BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
79. FLA. STAT. §562.21 (1971).
80. FLA. STAT. §561.50 (1971).

81. See Appendix B (Daily Average of Excise Tax Available).
82. They do, however, benefit from the cash sales law. F. STAT. §562.21 (1971).
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age and waste in bottling. 83 Although the amount of revenue lost is small
compared to the credit received by beer and liquor distributors, the wine
discount is not designed to compensate the bottler for the collection or payment of taxes but is instead a direct subsidy to the wine bottler for the loss
of his product.
Eliminating the Discounts
The amount paid by the State of Florida to beer and liquor distributors
in 1971-1972 totaled $2,712,918. s 4 To earn these reimbursements or credits,
each distributor filed monthly reports on the amount of liquor and beer sold
and taxes collected, and kept records and invoices of sales for inspection by
the Division of Beverage.8 5 The two per cent wine discount was earned with
less effort. Over $47,000 was awarded wine manufacturers and bottlers in
1970, 16 with no pretense of service performed for the benefit of the state by
those receiving the discount.
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that discounts for the reporting
of excise taxes collected and as compensation for wine "lost" are no longer
necessary. They serve only the interests of liquor and beer distributors and
wine bottlers. Consequently, the legislature should consider the reduction of
credits to a reasonable compensation for accounting for and remitting taxes
due to the state.
CREDIT RESTRICTIONS: WHO

PAYS FOR THE PUBLIC'S "PROTECTION"?

The "Tied House Evil Law"
In developing post-prohibition liquor legislation, lawmakers borrowed a
principle from antitrust regulation and determined that the integration of
manufacturers and distributors with retail outlets was a restraint of trade, 7
The antitrust section of the 1935 Beverage Act was known as the "tied house
evil law" ' and its provisions were intended to insure free and open competition by preventing the monopolistic practices that existed in the industry
prior to prohibition.89 Traditionally, a "tied house" connotes an inn or beer

83. FLA.

84.
85.

STAT.

§564.06(5)

(Supp. 1972).

See Appendices A, B (Annual Beverage Tax Discount).
FLA. STAT. §561.50 (1971). See Fla. Administrative Code ch. 7A, §§4.43, -. 44, -. 45.

86. FLORIDA HOUSE COMM. ON FINANCE AND TAXATION, STAFF REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE
18 (Nov. 1971). Specifically, $47,408 was given to wine manufacturers and bottlers during
the year ending June 30, 1970.
87. At common law, a contract or agreement that in its operation could control the
supply of a useful commodity to the injury of the public was considered against public
policy. Steward v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 56 Fla. 570, 587, 48 So. 19, 25 (1908).
Modern statutes enacted to prevent and punish unlawful combinations of trade evolved
from the common law concepts. See Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).

88.
89.

Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774, §4 (c), presently FLA. STAT. §561.42 (1971).
See note 15 supra.
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house rented from a person or firm from whom the tenant is compelled to
purchase the liquors to be consumed therein. 90 Tied house evil laws developed
from a philosophy that the public interest in the quality and prices of liquor
sold could be best protected where retail outlets were not tied to manufacturers or distributors, thereby affording vendors the advantage of open competition within the industry. 91 .
Following the historical proscription, Florida's Beverage Act, as well as
the 1935 Federal Alcohol Act,9 2 proposed to prevent the integration of retail
outlets with alcoholic beverage manufacturers by prohibiting any licensed
manufacturer or distributor from having an interest in the business of any
vendor or assisting the vendor with gifts, loans of money or property, or
rebates. 93 Because the granting or withholding of credit was recognized as
an effective means to control a buyer, both the Florida9 4 and federal95 acts
limited allowable credit to the "usual course of business." While the federal
law has remained virtually unchanged for thirty-seven years, repeated amendments have changed Florida's law from one protecting consumer interests to
one protecting the special interests of liquor distributors to the extent of
more than $100,000 each year.96
Through a 1943 amendment, 7 the Florida Legislature limited the meaning of credit "in the usual course of business" by prohibiting the extension
of credit beyond the tenth day after the calendar month within which a sale
was effectuated. When a vendor failed to pay within this time period, he was
required to pay for any future sales in cash.98
While this prohibition could be viewed as merely a reasonable attempt
to escape the vagueness of "credit in the usual course of business," a 1947
amendment placed further restrictions on credit. Credit extended to a vendor
by a distributor was limited to ten days after the calendar week within which
a sale was made. 99 If a vendor did not pay within this time, the Beverage
Department prohibited all further sales until liquors previously purchased
were fully paid for. ° Thus, distributors were granted an additional bonus

90.

SRouD's JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASEs

(3d ed. 1953).

91. See text accompanying notes 110-111 infra.

92. 27 U.S.C. §205 (1964).
93. 27 U.S.C. §205 (b); FLA. STAT. §561.42 (1) (1971).
94. FLA. STAT. §561.42(6) (1971).
95. 27 U.S.C.A. §205 (b) (6) (Supp. 1972) permits credit "usual and customary to the
industry for the particular class of transactions, as ascertained by the Secretary of the
Treasury and prescribed by regulations by him." The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
of the Internal Revenue Service, responsible for the enforcement of this provision, has
ascertained that the usual and customary credit is 30 days after the date of sale. 27 C.F.R.

§8.40 (1968).
96. See Appendix A (Interest on Invested Tax).
97. Fla Laws 1943, ch. 22078, §.
98. Id. The director of the Beverage Department was empowered to enforce these provisions through rules and reports.
99. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23746, §6.
100. The manufacturer or distributor who made the sale was required to notify the
Beverage Department of a delinquency. Id.
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in that the Beverage Department became in effect a collection agency for
distributors, enforcing payment by means of a vendor "blacklist."' '
A blacklisted vendor was not entirely foreclosed from the purchase of
additional stock, however. He could buy beverages from other retail vendors
and avoid the prohibition against further sales by a manufacturer or distributor. Since credit restrictions were designed to prevent manufacturers and
distributors from controlling vendors with the use of credit, this design obviously could not be subverted by allowing a delinquent vendor to purchase
stock from another vendor. Even so, the 1949 legislature eliminated this
possibility by restricting vendors to purchasing only from licensed manufacturers or distributors. 10 2 However, with the advent of cut-rate chain vendors,
the vendor-to-vendor sale prohibition had the effect of placing the independent retailer °3 at a disadvantage and was therefore deleted in 1972.104
101. See BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 32. In 1949 certain procedural safeguards
were added to take effect prior to the blacklisting of vendors. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25340, § 1.
FLA. STAT. §561.42(4) (1971) now provides the following: (I) The Division of Beverage is
required to give notification of delinquency to the vendor, (2) the vendor must either make
payment or within five days show cause why further sales should not be prohibited, (3)
the vendor is entitled to a hearing to show cause, but he must request such hearing in
writing within the five-day period, (4) if the hearing officer finds good cause is not shown
at the hearing, the vendor is permitted to seek review of the Board of Business Regulation.
102. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25359 (repealed 1972).
103. By offering to move a large number of cases of a manufacturer's brand within
a given time period, a chain store is able to bypass a distributor and bargain for a lower
price directly from the manufacturer. The manufacturer may notify the distributor to sell
the brand to the chain store at a reduced markup, and if the distributor refuses to do so
the manufacturer may pull his brand from the distributor. If the brand is a popular one,
this would mean loss of sales and profits for the distributor; therefore, compliance with the
manufacturer's request appears to be customary. Although the books of the wholesaler
record a sale, the manufacturer delivers his product directly to the chain warehouse. With
the growth of cut-rate chain vendors, small vendors found they were disadvantaged by
chain stores selling the same brands of beverages to the public for less than the independent
vendors could purchase them at wholesale. See BEVERAGE REPORT, supra note 5, at 40-41. A
price differential taken in Gainesville, Florida on March 17, 1971, showed an average difference of 12.6% between prices in a cut-rate chain store and wholesale prices. Id.
104. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-230 allows vendors to purchase from and sell to other
licensed vendors. The effect of the change allows smaller vendors to pool their orders and
bargain with manufacturers on a level with larger chain outlets. Although the 1972 amendment has relieved some of the purchasing inequities between independent retailers and
cut-rate chain stores, distributors have argued that arrangements for reduced wholesale
markups between manufacturers and vendors may violate the section of the tied house evil
law regulating trade discounts. See The Tampa (Fla.) Tribune, Sept. 15, 1972, §A at 17,
col. 5. There are three statutes relevant to that controversy: FLA. STAT. §561.42(1) (1971),
which prevents assistance (loans, gifts, et cetera) from manufacturers and distributors to
vendors; FLA. STAT. §561.42 (6) (1971), which states "Nothing herein shall be taken to forbid
the giving of trade discounts in the usual course of business"; FLA. STAT. §561.01 (13) (1971),
which defines "discount in the usual course of business" as a cash discount given simultaneously at the time of sale and one that is the same discount offered to all vendors buying
similar quantities. From 1953 to 1963 "discount in the usual course of business" included
the requirement that the discount "shall not exceed the allowable discount fixed by the
Director." Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28149, §4. In 1963, however, that provision was deleted. Fla.
Laws 1963, ch. 63-32, §1. Thus, the legislative intent appears clear. To be "allowable," a
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Even with the removal of the prohibition on vendor-to-vendor sales, distributors still benefit from the requirement that all sales of alcoholic beverages initially go through a distributor. 1 5 In addition, the present system of
credit restrictions continues to require the state to enforce a vendor blacklist
0 6
and act as collection agent for distributors.
Retail vendors have unsuccessfully challenged the law on several occasions, 0 7 principally on equal protection grounds. In each case the court
found a valid legislative purpose behind the credit restrictions and was unwilling to strike down the provisions. In Pickerill v. Schott,108 for example,
a pair of retail vendors failed to pay by the tenth day after the calendar week
in which they purchased liquor. Their defense was the contention that the
tied house evil law was violative of equal protection and due process requirements and was therefore unconstitutional.119 The Florida supreme court
noted that the purpose of the act was not to grant special privileges to wholesalers and manufacturers, but to prevent their control of retailers."" Since
control could be exercised through the granting and withholding of credit,
the court held there was a valid legislative purpose behind the credit restrictions in the tied house evil law.' 11
In a recent challenge before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,"1 2 a
retail vendor suggested that the tied house evil law evidenced horizontal
discrimination because retailers in other types of businesses had no such
credit restrictions"5 and, further, that the differing treatment between sales
of liquor and sales of beer and wine evidenced vertical discrimination."14
The court quoted Pickerill, however, and held that in light of "decades of
history in the handling of this traffic," with its social, economic, and political
consequences, the statutory distinctions were justified."1
Even though the courts have upheld the validity of the tied house evil
law, the question remains: Are credit restrictions desirable? An analysis of
discount must meet only the two requirements found presently in FLA.

STAT.

§561.01 (13)

(1971): (1) it should be a cash discount given simultaneously at the time of sale, and (2)
the same discount must be offered to all vendors buying similar quantities.
105. This requirement first appeared in the original Beverage Act as another protec-

tion against the integration of manufacturers with retail outlets. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774,
§1. It is presently found in FLA. STAT. §561.14(1) (1971), which directs manufacturers to
sell only to other manufacturers and distributors and to no one else within the state.
106. FLA. STAT. §561.42 (3) (1971).
107. Mayhue's Super Liquor Store v. Meiklejohn, 426 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1970); Pickerill v. Schott, 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815 (1952).
108. 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815 (1952).
109. Id. at 717.
110. Id. at 718, 719.
111. Id. at 719. The court also cited with approval an Illinois case, which reasoned
that because credit restrictions might restrict sales of alcoholic beverages, temperance also
could be a valid legislative purpose behind the tied house evil law. Id., citing Weisbury v.
Taylor, 409 Ill. 384, 100 N.E.2d 748 (1951). But see note 119 infra.
112. Mayhue's Super Liquor Store v. Meiklejohn, 426 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1970).
113. Id. at 146-47.
114. Id. at 147.
115. Id. at 148.
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the credit restrictions reveals certain inequities. Since wholesale liquor dealers collect the state taxes ten days after the week of the sale nl 6 but do not
7
remit these taxes to the state until ten days after the month of the sale,11
they derive the benefit of thousands of dollars of working capital in addition
to the guarantee of 100 per cent collections.118 Furthermore, every dollar of
working capital made available to distributors deprives vendors of the use
of the same, with the result that higher prices are passed on to the consumer.
Although the tied house evil law originally attempted to protect vendors
from the power of manufacturers and distributors, it is the vendors who
now are punished for credit violations, thereby enhancing the very power
sought to be curbed. Thus, what was instituted as an antitrust law for the
protection of the public has resulted in the granting of substantial privileges
to wholesale liquor dealers at the public expense.1 9
Beer and Wine Cash Sales Requirements
Credit on beer and wine in the 1935 Beverage Act was limited to "the
usual course of business."' 20 In 1939, however, a cash sales requirement was
placed on sales of domestic malt and brewed or vinous beverages between
wholesalers and retail licensees. 2 In 1943 the cash sale provision was extended to all beer.12 2 Not only does this requirement result in guaranteeing
100 per cent collections from vendors, but it supplies to the distributor for
23
use as working capital thousands of dollars of tax receipts.
Reasonable Credit for Vendors
Florida should no longer collect the bills of alcoholic beverage distributors
or stifle competition with credit restrictions that benefit only one segment of
the industry. With the institution of credit for a reasonable period of thirty
days after the date of sale, distributors who want the benefit of working
capital during that time will offer lower prices for prompt payment, allowing
116. FLA. STAT. §561.42(2) (1971).
117. FLA. STAT. §565.13 (Supp. 1972).
118. The amount of the tax discount and the working capital made available to the
wholesale distributors is shown in Appendix A.
119. Some would argue that the temperance purpose of beverage regulation justifies
the continuation of credit restriction because a reduction in the power to buy diminishes
the volume of sales, which in turn results in less consumption of alcoholic beverages. See
note Ill supra. However, if temperance is to be a goal of alcoholic beverage regulation in
Florida, and if it is to be achieved by charging the public high prices for liquor, then it
should not be cloaked in a law that ostensibly exists for the purpose of protecting the
retailer and public from high prices.
120. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16774, §4 (c).
121. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19568. This gave Florida beer a special privilege. The wholesaler could sell Florida beer for cash without fear of his competitor offering to sell on
credit. However, this did not solve the competition problem with nondomestic beer.
122. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 21840, §2. The word "domestic" was deleted from the earlier
provision. Id.
123. See Appendix B.
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retailers a choice of early payment with cash discounts or timely payment at
regular prices. The public will benefit from the resultant free and open competition in the beverage industry, which was the object of the credit restrictions at the outset.
CONCLUSION

It is incumbent upon the legislature to critically examine the alcoholic
beverage laws to determine if the effect of these laws is in keeping with the
original goals of beverage regulation. This note has suggested three areas in
which original goals have been subverted by special interest legislation, promoted by the industry itself.
The temperance goal of the original license quota provision has been
rendered nugatory by statutory exceptions to that provision. Even so, the
quota continues to make it possible for a private party to realize as much as
fifteen times the cost of the state license on a sale to another party, in addition to providing large retail chains the opportunity to monopolize package
store and lounge sales. If the temperance goal is outmoded, then the quota
on licenses should be removed in order to leave unhindered the additional
goal of free and open competition.
Furthermore, it is evident that collection credits given alcoholic beverage
distributors not only deprive the state of additional revenue, but are unmerited as compensation for expenses accruing to distributors for reporting
excise taxes to the state. These credits should be reduced to an amount
reasonably comparable to the expenses actually incurred.
Finally, the special status given alcoholic beverage distributors is most
visible in existing credit restrictions that force retailers to forfeit thousands of
dollars of working capital to the use of distributors under a law originally
designed to protect retailers. If a goal of liquor regulation is to prevent the
manipulation of retail vendors by manufacturers and distributors, the state
should be removed as a bill collector for distributors, and the allowance of
credit in the usual course of business should be restored.
MARTHA L. CocmAN
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